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EDITORIAL 
 
In Search of Defining Ethics in (Mathematics) 
Education Research? 
 
David W. Stinson 
Georgia State University 
 
his editorial is inspired by an essay by Paul Ernest (2012), “What is Our First 
Philosophy in Mathematics Education?,” which I recently uncovered as I was 
preparing for my summer courses. In the introduction, Ernest asks— 
 
Can mathematics education have a first philosophy? Is there a branch of philosophy 
that is a sine qua non for mathematics education research and possible its practice as 
well? Are there philosophical assumptions that cannot be avoided in pursuing any in-
quiries whatsoever in our field? Can these assumptions be located in one branch of phi-
losophy? (p. 8)  
 
Ernest offers five alternative “candidates” as a response to this singularly focused set 
of questions. Two candidates are general branches of philosophy—the philosophy of 
mathematics and the philosophy, if you will, of critical theory—and the other three 
candidates are general areas of philosophical inquiry—ontology, epistemology, and 
ethics.1 Throughout the essay, Ernest provides justifications of why both the philos-
ophy of mathematics and the philosophy of critical theory as well as ontology and 
epistemology fall short in providing a first philosophy for mathematics education 
research and practice.  
After eliminating the first four candidates, Ernest (2012) makes a four-
pronged argument for ethics as a first philosophy. Ethics, he claims, “enters into 
mathematics education research in several ways” (p. 13). First, ethics is at the cen-
ter of the research process with respect to seeking informed consent, causing no 
harm or detriment, and ensuring confidentiality for all those involved. Ernest be-
lieves that any research that does not conform to these most basic standards “is eth-
ically flawed and its knowledge claims are suspect” (p. 13). Second, mathematics 
education researchers are participating “in the great, age-old human conversation 
that sustains and extends our common knowledge and cultural heritage,” as such 
                                                        
1 These are the branches of study that are concerned with the nature of being, the theory of know-
ledge, and the principals of moral behavior, respectively. 
T 
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“we and others benefit and grow” (p. 13.) Third, the species of human beings de-
pends on its survival by sharing in ethical social and life behaviors with fellow hu-
mans. And fourth, drawing on Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) and his ethics as first 
philosophy,2 Ernest states, according to Levinas— 
 
we owe a debt to the other that precedes and goes beyond reasons, decisions, and our 
thought processes, and precedes and exceeds any attempt to understand the other. Our 
infinite responsibility to the other person is, of course, ethical: “Ethics precedes ontolo-
gy […] ethics primarily signifies obligation toward the other, that it leads to the Law 
and to gratuitous service, which is not a principle of technique” (Levinas, 1987, p. 
183). (p. 13) 
 
In the end, Ernest (2012) contends that positioning ethics as a first philosophy 
for mathematics education research enables us (i.e., the larger mathematics educa-
tion research community) “to rethink and re-evaluate some of the taken-for-granted 
commonplaces of our practices” (p. 14), which opens up new possibilities for theo-
rizing and researching mathematics teaching and learning. 
Ernest’s 2012 essay is neither his first discussion on ethical considerations in 
the field (see, e.g., Ernest, 19913), nor is he the only mathematics education scholar 
to explore directly the ethical implications of our work as researchers. Nearly two 
decades ago, Judith Sowder (1998) explicitly placed ethics at the center of the 
mathematics education research process in her contribution to the International 
Congress on Mathematical Instruction study Mathematics Education as a Research 
Domain: A Search for Identity (Sierpinska & Kilpatrick, 1998). Given the shift 
from largely quantitative methodology to qualitative methodology that occurred in 
mathematics education research during the 1980s (Lester & Lambdin, 2003), 
Sowder believed that new questions with respect to ethics should be explored (see 
also Adler & Lerman, 20034). Much of her discussion can be characterized as align-
ing with Ernest’s (2012) first argument for ethics as a first philosophy: ethical con-
siderations in the most basic standards of conducting research, for example, pur-
pose, informed consent, minimizing harm, maximizing benefits, confidentiality, 
data use, data interpretation, and so forth. She concluded, stating: “Ethical decision 
making is difficult. There are times when we face conflicting ethical demands, and 
a decision must be made—a decision with which we want to be satisfied in the long 
run” (p. 440). 
                                                        
2 See Atweh and Brady (2009) and Neyland (2004) for discussions of Levinas’s ethics as first phi-
losophy applied to mathematics teaching and learning.  
 
3 Traces of concern for ethical considerations in the field of mathematics education are found 
throughout Ernest’s prolific body of scholarship.  
 
4 See also Andersson and le Roux (2017) for a discussion of ethical considerations in writing in 
mathematics education research. 
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Uncovering Ernest’s 2012 essay this summer reignited my own struggles, 
concerns, and doubts in becoming an ethical critical postmodern5 mathematics edu-
cation scholar and researcher. These struggles, concerns, and doubts came into my 
being as I entered the field as a researcher and have grown exponentially (it seems) 
when I consider the entirety of the roles that I have occupied in the field: partici-
pant, researcher, presenter, writer, reviewer, editor, and so forth. My struggles (and 
so forth) originated when my journey into postmodern theory began to expose the 
fault line of research done within the humanist tradition (St. Pierre, 2000). Within 
the ruptures of this fault line, researcher ethics emerged, for me at least, as the pri-
mary concern of education research—becoming an issue that was not completely 
addressed by the inquiries of an Institutional Review Board (Guillemin & Gillam, 
2004). Uncovering Ernest’s essay this summer, therefore, gave me solace, if you 
will, that I was somewhat on the “right” track, back then and now. 
Being “well schooled” as an education researcher in the early 2000s, I was 
carefully taught that there was a crisis in representation (Marcus & Fischer, 1986) 
and an end to innocence (Van Maanen, 1995) in the work that we do as (mathemat-
ics) education researchers. Nevertheless, as I acknowledge, both then and now, a 
crisis in representation and an end to innocence, I continue to ask: Is everything 
dangerous? I argue, yes, while using Foucault’s (1983/1997) reconfiguration of the 
word dangerous: “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dan-
gerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we 
always have something to do” (p. 256). 
It is the coupling of Marcus and Fischer’s (1986) and Van Maanen’s (1995) 
arguments and Foucault’s (1983/1997) statement, and postmodern theory in gen-
eral, that continues to present me with some troubling questions: Given that there is 
still work to do, how do I (we) go about doing that work, ethically? Does showcas-
ing and monitoring my (our) subjectivities address ethical concerns (Glesne, 1999; 
Peshkin, 1988)? Or does presenting thick descriptions (Geertz, 1973)? Or is it re-
conceptualizing validity (Lather, 1986)? Although helpful, I believe, engaging in a 
combination of these methodological procedures (and others) in our research is only 
a starting point in confronting the crisis in representation, as we acknowledge that 
our work is not innocent and is always dangerous.  
As a critical postmodern researcher, the aspect of the research process that I 
focus on most, in order that I might sleep at night, is my ethics. In making the fore-
going statement, I understand that I might be seeking a metanarrative around ethics, 
                                                        
5 Often the words postmodernism and poststructuralism are used interchangeable in the literature; 
however, there are acknowledged differences in the terms (for a brief discussion see St. Pierre, 
2000, pp. 506–507). Following Walshaw (2004), I use the term postmodern as a general term that 
attempts to capture the nuances of both words (also see Ernest, 1998). See Stinson and Bullock 
(2012, 2015) for discussions on the phrase critical postmodern in mathematics education research. 
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which I have incredulity toward (Lyotard, 1979/19846). But in considering ethics as 
a first philosophy (Ernest, 2012), I somehow get out of the metanarrative quandary. 
… I think. Nonetheless, I do not get complete peace of mind by showcasing and 
monitoring my subjectivity or by presenting thick descriptions, neither from search-
ing for disconfirming evidence nor conducting triangulation of data (Silverman, 
2000). Although these methodological procedures are important components of the 
research process, I get most of my peace of mind by engaging, continuously and 
chaotically, my ethics. 
But how do I talk about ethics? How do I “represent” or “define” ethics? How 
do I talk about and represent engaging in continuous and chaotic ethics without es-
tablishing a metanarrative around ethics, which begins to surveil and discipline eth-
ics (Foucault, 1975/1995)? Shouldn’t ethics always be unsurveilled, undisciplined, 
continuous, and chaotic engagement? Oops, is the aforementioned statement the 
start of a metanarrative? Then again, would a metanarrative around ethics be such a 
bad thing? 
I state explicitly here that I do not wish to engage in a critical discussion about 
ethics (see, e.g., Dewey, 1932/1985), a discussion that has been ongoing since the 
question What is ethics? was even possible to ask. I do, however, discuss, although 
briefly, how I have come to think about framing my researcher ethics and provide a 
definition of ethics that I attempt to continuously and chaotically engage throughout 
the multiple roles I occupy in the field of mathematics education research. 
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) identify two different dimensions of ethics in 
research: “procedural ethics and ‘ethics in practice’” (p. 262). They define proce-
dural ethics as those ethical issues most often addressed by research ethics commit-
tees (e.g., Institutional Review Boards). And they define “ethics in practice” as the 
ongoing day-to-day ethical issues that arise throughout the research process (e.g., 
the disclosure of sensitive information from a research participant). Although Guil-
lemin and Gillam perceive continuity between the two dimensions, they frame “eth-
ics in practice” within reflexivity. Reflexivity, in research, requires thinking about 
the researcher’s positionality and how the process of conducting research affects the 
study and the human relationships developed throughout the study (Glesne, 1999). 
Guillemin and Gillam claim that in being reflexive the researcher becomes alert not 
only to issues related to knowledge creation (i.e., epistemology) but also to the ethi-
cal issues of research. In so doing, they believe, the researcher adopts “a continuous 
process of critical scrutiny and interpretation, not just in relation to the research 
methods and the data but also to the researcher, participants, and the research con-
text” (p. 275). 
                                                        
6  Lyotard (1979/1984) believed that metanarratives are foundational in supporting “universal 
truths” that serve to legitimate modern culture; meta- or grand-narratives are evident in “the dia-
lectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, 
or the creation of wealth” (p. xxiii). 
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It is Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) concept of reflexivity and ethics in prac-
tice that best frames how I bring into play a definition of ethics, which offers a 
means for thinking and rethinking ethical issues throughout the research process, no 
matter what role I am playing. The Dalai Lama (1999), in his book Ethics for the 
New Millennium, suggests that ethics is an understanding that we all desire happi-
ness, and we all seek to avoid suffering. Thus, he believes 
 
what is entailed…is not an admission of guilt but…a reorientation of our heart and 
mind away from self and toward others. To develop…an attitude of mind whereby, 
when we see an opportunity to benefit others, we will take it in preference to merely 
looking after our own narrow interests. But though, of course, we care about what is 
beyond our scope, we accept it as part of nature and concern ourselves with doing what 
we can. (p. 162–163)  
 
The Dalai Lama’s definition of ethics does not require one to solve the “world’s 
problems”; it simply requires one to seek ways of assisting in others’ happiness and 
security concurrently with her or his own, decentering oneself to attempt to become 
the other. Becoming the other is never possible; it is, however, I believe, the honest 
attempt that is an ethical act. Moreover, such a definition of ethics, I believe, re-
quires an ethics of care of the self and, in turn, care of others (Foucault, 1984/1988).  
In the end, as I live, think, and interact within a critical postmodern existence, 
there appears to be a bottomless abyss of ethical issues that trouble the research 
process (and the field of mathematics education in general). Yet, by continuously 
and chaotically engaging my ethics throughout the research decision-making pro-
cess, I believe, I successfully negotiated some of these issues—doing dangerous 
work, ethically. And yes, I will continue to take up Ernest’s (2012) suggestion: eth-
ics as a first philosophy for mathematics education research (and practice). 
– What is your first philosophy? 
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